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Book Review
Black And White
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE. Edited By Richard
Delgado. t Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995. Pp. xvi, 592.
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"So MANY DREAMS DEAD."'
INTRODUCTION
Critical Race Theory dreams in black and white. No rhapsody of
color, only charred history and pale hope. Yet the dreams stamp hard,
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inspiring a jurisprudential movement of diverse scholars and earning an
uneasy place in the postwar scholarship of the American legal academy.
Having waged both theoretical and practical battles to gain that place,
Critical Race theorists are loath to surrender it, a tribute of remembrance
to the "barbaric century"2 of their shared racial oppression. Nor should
they yield. Without the pain of memory, there is no struggle. And with-
out struggle, there is no progress.
In this Essay, I consider the progress of Critical Race Theory
("CRT") symbolized by two inaugural collections of accumulated
movement scholarship: Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge3 and
Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement.'
Both collections represent important, indeed path-breaking work in
American law. Parsing works of this magnitude-together the collec-
tions comprise some 77 articles and 1,075 pages-poses uncommon
challenges. Chief among these is the summons of inclusion. The articles
represent a wide range of scholarship that spans doctrinal, jurispru-
dential, and interdisciplinary subjects. Such far-reaching coverage defies
comprehensive, even-handed treatment.
No less of a hurdle is the demand of relevance. The instant scholar-
ship charts the intellectual history of a movement still in development,
advancing from an early vanguard period to a middle period of internal
fracture5 and external siege.6 Granting each period an equal claim of
relevance invites summary treatment, which risks diminishing the full
texture of the movement's evolution. A predominantly retrospective
focus, as here, reduces the risk of loss.
2. See Comel West, Foreword to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT xi, xii (Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, & Kendall Thomas
eds., 1995) [hereinafter KEY WRITINGS].
3. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) [hereinafter
CUTTING EDGE].
4. KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2.
5. See infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
6. Assaults come from liberal and conservative fronts at home and abroad. See, e.g., Heather
MacDonald, Rule of Law: Law School Humbug, WALL ST. 1, Nov. 8, 1995, at A21 (characterizing
CRT as "a dangerous flight from reason and logic in favor of emotion and group solidarity"); Jeffrey
Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits: O.J. Simpson, Critical Race Theory, the Law, and the Triumph of
Color in America, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 27 (describing CRT as "a stark challenge to the
liberal ideal of the rule of law"); Andrew Sullivan, Truth and Lies in the Language Class, SUNDAY
TIMEs (London), Jan. 12, 1997, at 1 (complaining that "critical race theorists are acquiring the
blessing of the intellectual and political establishments in a way that bodes particularly ill for the
future of race relations").
[Vol. 10:561
BLACK AND WHITE
1997] BLACK AND WHITE 1649
Beyond the choices of inclusion and relevance, historical render-
ings of this kind hazard errors of essentialism.7 Doubtless essentialist
errors may take many forms. Within the history and jurisprudence of
race in American law, however, two forms seem prevalent. Both translate
roughly into empirical claims of fact. The first involves the claim of
universality. The second concerns the claim of dichotomy. Both employ
fallacies.
The universality claim generalizes from blanket assertions of
human nature. To essentialize race under the logic of universality is to
suggest that people of color possess certain inherent and immutable
character traits. Consider, for example, the image of dangerous young
black males in contemporary criminal law.
The dichotomy claim, by contrast, distinguishes common or shared
categories of the natural world as separate and discrete phenomena. To
essentialize race under the logic of dichotomy is to maintain that people
of color suffer discrimination as a result of intentional, rather than un-
intentional, conduct. Consider, for instance, the current distinction be-
tween conscious and unconscious racism governing the statutory
standards of civil rights liability.
In each of the above respects, I shall confess error from the outset.
At its core, this Essay conceives of Critical Race Theory in terms of a
black/white paradigm. The early tenor of CRT literature echoes this
7. Clark Freshman, for example, points to essentialist tendencies in Richard Posner's treatment
of CRT. See Clark Freshman, Were Patricia Williams and Ronald Dworkin Separated at Birth?, 95
COLUM. L REv. 1568, 1590-91 (1995) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995)).
However, these tendencies seem less pronounced in Posner's more recent commentary on the
subject. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. Cm. L. REV. 737, 743 (1997) (reviewing
LAW's STORIES (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996)).
8. Frank Valdes employs the term "Black/White paradigm" to describe the limitations of
traditional CRT analysis in deconstructing the dimensions of race and race-based subordination in a
multi-cultural society. See Francisco Valdes, Latinalo Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, and Post-
Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practices to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA LJ. 1, 5-7
(1996). Valdes observes:
The "Black/White paradigm" thus signifies the reduction of race relations in American
society and law to the relations between "white" Euro-Americans to "black" African
Americans. Consequently, this paradigm ignores or denies the existence and relevance of
persons hued with other colors, such as Asian Americans, Native Americans, and
Latinas/os. In addition, this paradigm marginalizes even persons who are hued white or
black but who derive from cultural or geographic destinations other than Europe or Africa,
such as persons from Caribbean nations, who identify as both black and Latina/o.
Id. at5 n.19.
For other scholarly critiques of the black-white paradigm, see Juan Perea, The Black-White
Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REV.
1213 (1997), 10 LA RAZA LJ. 127 (1997); Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not
Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1995); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth
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essentialist dichotomy. Although the tone of subsequent literature weak-
ens that dichotomy, it succeeds only by enlarging the category of black
identity. Prodded increasingly by the work of feminist,9 gay and
lesbian, 0 Native-American," LatCrit,"2 and Asian-American 3 scholars
entering the Critical Race community, the black identity position no
longer exclusively frames CRT evaluative judgment. Yet, the black-white
opposition remains vibrant, lacking the means of, and motives for, rec-
onciliation.
A slow progress towards reconciliation, however, may be imminent.
While the rhetoric of progress no longer echoes through jurisprudential
writings on race, evidence of a gathering course-change gives some rea-
son for hope of amelioration. The change, signified by the instant
Symposium, is bound up in the emergence of LatCrit theory.
Whatever the ultimate judgment reached on the merits of LatCrit
theory, this Symposium plainly captures an extraordinary moment in
the jurisprudence of American law. Even if its full ramifications remain
unclear, the moment exhibits both the consolidation and the splintering
of Critical Race Theory. For movements of any significant political and
jurisprudential import, internal and external ruptures often prove fatal.
Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L REV.
1181, 1185-1201 (1997) (book review).
9. See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997); Kimberld
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of
Color, 43 STAN. L REV. 1241 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Lea VanderVelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott,
106 YALE LJ. 1033 (1997).
10. See, e.g., Odeana R. Neal, The Limits of Legal Discourse: Learning from the Civil Rights
Movement in the Quest for Gay and Lesbian Civil Rights, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L REV. 679 (1996);
Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities & Inter-
Connectivities, 5 S. CAL. REV. L & WOMEN'S STUD. 25 (1995); Jane S. Schacter, Skepticism,
Culture and the Gay Civil Rights Debate in a Post-Civil-Rights Era, 110 HARV. L REV. 684 (1997)
(book review).
11. See, e.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT (1990); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER (1997); Robert A.
Williams, Jr., Linking Arms Together: Multicultural Constitutionalism in a North American Indigenous
Vision of Law and Peace, 82 CALIF. L REV. 981 (1994); Jo Carrillo, Surface and Depth: Some
Methodological Problems with Bringing Native American-Centered Histories to Light, 20 N.Y.U. REV.
L & Soc. CHANGE 405 (1993) (reviewing EXILED IN THE LAND OF THL FREE (Oren R. Lyons &
John C. Mohawk eds., 1992)).
12. See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hernmdndez-Truyol, Borders (En)Gendered-Normativities,
Latinas, and a LatCrit Paradigm, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997); Valdes, supra note 8.
13. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81
IOWA L REV. 1467 (1996); Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical
Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CALIF. L REV. 1241, 1 ASIAN LJ. 1
(1993); Margaret (H.R.) Chon, On the Need for Asian American Narratives in Law: Ethnic Specimens,
Native Informants, Storytelling and Silences, 3 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 4 (1995).
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The rise and fall of the Critical Legal Studies movement offers a case in
point.
Surprisingly, acknowledging the internal and external challenges
brought by LatCrit theory against Critical Race Theory leads to a con-
trary result. Instead of weakening Critical Race Theory, the challenges
seem to broaden its theoretical scope and enlarge its practical relevance,
thereby strengthening its oppositional voice in mainstream jurispru-
dence. This result follows from the complementary motivations and
methodologies of LatCrit theory.
Unlike certain orthodox strands of the CRT literature, LatCrit.the-
ory encourages cross-racial and multicultural coalition-building. Two
values motivate this impulse: the intrinsic norm of community and the
instrumental norm of political action. LatCrit's application of under-
utilized methods of cultural and linguistic investigation to more diverse
communities of color makes coalition politics viable and racial recon-
ciliation possible.
The theme of reconciliation-political and spiritual-figures
prominently in this Essay. From the beginning, it construes Critical Race
Theory as an emerging legal-political reform movement of divergent
methods and varying goals. Methodologically, the Essay starts from the
premise of the postmodern challenge. Vigorously pressed in recent
years, the postmodern challenge assails both descriptive and prescriptive
modes of legal reasoning. The assault on descriptive methods of legal
pedagogy 4 and practice," encompassing formalism and instrumental-
ism, advances under the charge of incoherence. The attack on similarly
controlling prescriptive methods, such as legislative reform and remedial
adjudication, 6 rises out of post-Realist anti-foundational instincts.
Shared by remnants of the Critical Legal Studies movement, these in-
stincts promote a deep-seated skepticism towards the foundational con-
cepts of racial equality and justice. Applied here, postmodern skepticism
precludes Enlightenment faith in the ability to winnow out the objective
truth about Critical Race Theory, its proponents, or its subjects. At best,
postmodernism allows that standard modes of investigation and reason-
ing may afford a contingent stance from which to offer a perspective on
Critical Race Theory-sometimes correct, sometimes faulty, always idio-
syncratic.
14. See Pierre Schlag, Hiding the Ball, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1681 (1996).
15. See Pierre Schlag, Law as the Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 CALIF. L REV. 427
(1997).
16. See Symposium, The Critique of Normativity, 139 U. PA. L REV. 801 (1991); see also Pierre
Schlag, Values, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 219 (1994).
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Normatively, the Essay proceeds from a vision of CRT as a legal-
political movement of activists and ideas dedicated to serving clients and
communities of color. That presupposition imagines CRT scholars
rushing to enter the fray of legal-political controversy, such as the cur-
rent disputes over the place of race in crime and criminal justice, the
environment, jury selection and deliberation, legal ethics, and court pro-
cedure. Put differently, the Essay expects CRT to embrace political en-
gagement on both theoretical and practical planes. What follows then
may be fairly described as an activist's critique of activists: political and
jurisprudential.
Having given fair warning, it is beneficial quickly to situate this
Essay in the larger, ongoing body of work undertaken by others
sympathetic to the Critical Race project. 7 For many harboring a shared
devotion to the theoretical study of racism and the practical pursuit of
racial justice, CRT provides the cardinal framework for understanding
the construction of race in American law, culture, and society. For those
especially devoted to study of the historical intersection of race and
lawyers in American law, 8 CRT demonstrates the utility of interdiscipli-
nary methodologies in deciphering the applied meaning of racial dis-
course, identity, and power. True to its insurgent history, CRT infuses
such methodologies with an oppositional spirit garnered from sustained
protest.
17. See, e.g., Symposium, Representing Race, 95 MICH. L REV. 723 (1997); Robert L.
Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Tales of White Folk Doctrine, Narrative, and the Reconstruction of
Racial Reality, 84 CALIF. L REV. 377 (1996) (reviewing RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO
CHRONICLES (1995)); Kenneth L. Karst, Integration Success Story, 69 S. CAL. L REV. 1781 (1996)
(book review).
18. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Underrepresentation of Minorities in the Legal
Profession: A Critical Race Theorist's Perspective, 95 MICH. L REV. 1005 (1997); Margaret M.
Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black Attorneys and the Straitjacket of Legal Practice,
95 MICH. L. REV. 766 (1997); David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a
Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?. 63 GEO. WASH. L REV. 1030 (1995); David B. Wilkins,
Social Engineers or Corporate Tools? Brown v. Board of Education and the Conscience of the Black
Corporate Bar, in RACE, L & CuLTuRE 137 (Austin Sarat ed., 1997); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu
Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84
CALIF. L. REV. 493 (1996).
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned work, the overall scarcity of studies investigating the
historical interconnections of race and lawyers in American law indicates the continuing neglect of
CRT as a source for the development of a jurisprudential framework to understand the rhetoric of
race or "race-talk" in legal advocacy, rules of law, and judicial decisions. To be useful, that
framework must situate racial rhetoric in particularized criminal and civil case contexts. See, e.g.,
Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEx. L REV. (forthcoming 1998); Margaret M. Russell, Entering
Great America: Reflections on Race and the Convergence of Progressive Legal Theory and Practice,
43 HAsrINGS L.J. 749 (1992).
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To ascertain the genesis of that spirit, the Essay opens with a brief
genealogy of CRT. First, it tracks CRT's historical rupture with the civil
rights movement. Then, it explores CRT's modernist disenchantment
with Critical Legal Studies. Finally, it examines CRT's wavering post-
modernist renunciation of liberal theory. The Essay next considers the
main points of the CRT critique of American law and society. Specifi-
cally, it addresses race consciousness and identity, racial power, racial-
ized doctrine and narrative, and modes of race/gender/ethnic
intersectionality. Last, the Essay contemplates the CRT espousal of
postmodernism, coalition-building, and praxis, analyzing tensions
arising from the attempted reconciliation of liberallpostmodern and
theoretical/practical commitments to law and legal advocacy.
Constructive engagement in law and legal advocacy demands a lib-
eral faith in reason and incremental reform. Part of that faith entails a
tolerance for imperfection and halting progress. Neither faith nor
tolerance informs the postmodern sensibility. Like the theoreticians of
the Law and Economics and Critical Legal Studies movements, the
metaphysicians of law and postmodernism display an impatience with
and a distaste for the practical. Rooted in a higher aspiration for law that
is laudable, nonetheless, the upshot is a disdain for liberal legalism that
condemns the victims of procedural bias and substantive prejudice to
hardship. The tensions bearing on the liberal/postmodern and
theory/practice divide thus persist unabated.
Although some, Angela Harris most eloquently, exhort CRT activ-
ists "consciously to inhabit that very tension," 19 this admonition comes
with little or no reference to the constraints of discursive practices, in-
stitutional procedures, or social relations encountered in law and
lawyering. Legal activists ignore these constraints at their own peril and
at grave risk to their clients and surrounding communities.
Even glancing familiarity with the most ordinary advocacy contexts
reveals that the practices of constitutional, statutory, and doctrinal dis-
course regulate attorney-client speech. Similarly, the institutional proce-
dures of federal, state, and local bureaucracies restrict attorney-client
freedom of choice in advocacy. Likewise, the social relationships of
class, gender, race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation limit attorney-client
as well as judge-client understanding in advocacy settings.
19. Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CALIF. L REV. 741,
760 (1994); see also Anthony E. Cook, Reflections on Postmodernism, 26 NEw ENG. L. REv. 751, 752
(1992) (investigating whether "progressive scholars [can] define postmodernism in a way that
simultaneously preserves the hope of progress and transformation ... and yet remains open and
responsive to divergent narratives of oppression").
1998]
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The task of finding room to maneuver within, and formulating
strategies to overcome, juridical constraints on behalf of people of color
is CRT's greatest challenge. The record to date lacks any substantial
evidence that CRT aspires to meet that challenge. The continued failure
to come to the aid of the subordinated clients and communities it airily
celebrates will undermine CRT, just as it does Critical Legal Studies.
This type of failure condemns jurisprudential movements not to death,
but to irrelevance or, worse, triviality.
I
GENEALOGY
Critical Race Theory offers a jurisprudence grafted from the prac-
tical ventures of civil rights advocacy2 ° and the theoretical forays of
Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") scholarship.2 This hybrid jurisprudence
produces a kind of "left intervention into race discourse and a race in-
tervention into left discourse."'  Indeed, within CRT, the concrete
pragmatics of civil rights advocacy and the abstract interrogations of
CLS scholarship converge to form a powerful engine of socio-legal
analysis. Despite such convergence, CRT turns away from both civil
rights and CLS antecedents, breaking from the liberal ideology of racial
consensus dominant in the era of law reform following Brown v. Board
of Education.3
Evidence of this break comes from CRT's rejection of the norms
of racial integration. That rejection goes beyond the critique of civil
rights advocates for their paternalistic resolution of attorney-client and
client-community conflicts over litigation strategy or remedial imple-
mentation.24 Moreover, the rejection skirts the criticism of CLS for its
20. See, e.g., JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS (1994); MARK V. TUSHNET, THm
NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987); Jonathan
Feldman, Race-Consciousness Versus Colorblindness in the Selection of Civil Rights Leaders:
Reflections upon Jack Greenberg's Crusaders in the Courts, 84 CALIF. L REV. 151 (1996) (book
review).
21. For a discussion of the rise and fall of CLS, see Richard Michael Fischl, The Question that
Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 779 (1992); Symposium, Critical Legal Studies, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
22. Introduction to KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at xiii, xix.
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. For a discussion of the relationship between civil rights attorneys and their clients, see
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 317-57 (1988); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving 71vo Masters:
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J, 470 (1976);
William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and
Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623 (1997).
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repudiation of "rights talk."' For Critical Race theorists, even the en-
lightened, liberal discourse of civil rights patronage too often evokes
racist ideology.
Nonetheless, like the mainstream civil rights movement, CRT stands
as a descriptive and a normative enterprise engaged in critical interven-
tion and transformative remediation.2 6 The motive force behind that en-
terprise is not only an ethical commitment to human liberation, but also
a moral aspiration for racial justice. To Critical Race theorists, however,
the ripening of moral commitment into ideological critique is a neces-
sary precondition for political empowerment and social transformation.
The key to that transformation rests on the formulation of oppositional
accounts of race in legal-political discourse.
Fundamentally, the Critical Race project focuses on the interrela-
tionship of race and discourse. By exposing racialized narratives em-
bedded within the constitutional, statutory, and common law traditions
of American legal discourse, Critical Race theorists seek to ascertain the
role of law in the construction of racial hierarchy and racist ideology.
To grasp the role of law and its agents (lawyers and judges) in the
creation and maintenance of dominant-subordinate race relations,
Critical Race theorists search out racialized stories disclosed in socio-
legal and cultural contexts. Racialized stories share overt and covert
forms. Overtly racialized stories may be found in court opinions, law-
yers' closing arguments, and witness testimony. More shrouded, cov-
ertly racialized stories may be detected in judges' evidentiary rulings,
lawyers' peremptory challenges, and parties' discovery documents.
To their credit, Critical Race theorists eschew crude forms of ra-
cialism 7 in rendering those enmeshed textual accounts. Instead, they
increasingly gather particularized narratives from individuals and com-
munities of color situated in law-sanctioned hierarchies of race, gender,
ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation. CRT gains its oppositional voice
and liberating vision by revealing these often suppressed incidents of
suffering. The attempt to translate that vision into a theory of racial
25. Compare Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEx. L REV. 1563 (1984), with Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes:
Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REv. 401 (1987).
26. See Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo Newborn, Critical Race Theory and Classical-Liberal Civil
Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without a Difference?, 82 CALIF. L REv. 787 (1994).
27. Racialism refers to "accounts of racial power that explain legal and political decisions
which are adverse to people of color as mere reflections of underlying white interest." Introduction
to KEY WRITINOS, supra note 2, at xxiv. Implicit in these accounts is the presumption that "racial
interests or racial identity exists [sic] somewhere outside of or prior to law" locked within the
instrumental apparatus of the state. Id.
1998]
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jurisprudence and a practice of progressive racial politics without essen-
tializing racial identity or community creates internal tensions that
sometimes explode into wider controversy,28 such as the recent quarrels
over voice,29 story,3" autobiography,3' and racial fundamentalism.32
28. Participants in these incendiary controversies sometimes succumb to belligerence, assailing
each other for perceived transgressions in demonstrated qualities of integrity, judgment, and
tolerance. Compare Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 Gao. LJ. 251
(1992) ("The flaws in the stories I discuss are, in the end, failures in integrity and judgment .... "),
and Mark Tushnet, Reply, 81 GEO. L.J. 343, 343 (1992) (characterizing Gary Peller's response to his
earlier article as "driven by two intellectual failures, misrepresentation and inconsistency"), with
Gary Peller, The Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEo. LJ. 313, 314 (1992) ("I believe
that the failures of intellectual rigor that mark Tushnet's essay are manifestations of tension about the
cultural dynamics underlying his intervention.").
29. Quarrels over voice involve the meaning of authenticity and adequate representation in
claims brought on behalf of people of color in legal scholarship. Randall Kennedy derides the notion
of black academic authenticity generally, while chiding CRT scholars specifically for making
overblown claims of distinction. Moreover, he scorns the idea of a representative black community.
Staking out a pluralist position on black history, he rejects the unitary ideal of a single, cohesive black
experience. By contrast, both Richard Delgado and Alex Johnson find a special quality in the voice of
color individually and collectively enunciated in CRT scholarship. Compare Randall L. Kennedy,
Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L REV. 1745 (1989), with Colloquy, Responses to
Randall Kennedy's Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1844 (1990), and Richard
Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L REv. 95 (1990). See
also Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of Color:
Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L REV. 803 (1994); Alex
M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991).
30. Disputes about story rise out of the growing use of narrative and storytelling in both feminist
and CRT scholarship. Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry reprimand CRT scholars and others for
advancing descriptive and prescriptive narrative claims without the support of traditional legal and
non-legal sources of authority. Furthermore, they challenge the credibility and typicality of such
claims. By way of defense, Richard Delgado and William Eskridge contend that narrative and
storytelling enable legal scholars to capture the experience of subordination suffered in law as well
as in society. Compare Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay
on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L REV. 807 (1993), and Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The
200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov: Further Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. Rav.
647 (1994), with Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46
VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993), and William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN, L RE . 607
(1994). See also Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre-Understanding: A Defense of Outsider
Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEO. L.J. 1845 (1994).
31. Opponents of autobiography attack the swell of self-referential narratives in legal
scholarship. In a sharp rebuke, Ann Coughlin argues that these narratives contribute nothing of
consequence to legal scholarship beyond anecdotal self-citation. Equally adamant, Richard Delgado
and Jerome McCristal Culp assert that autobiographical narratives illuminate larger sociolegal forces
of racial oppression impinging upon individuals. These narratives, they insist, demonstrate the
availability and, at times, also the futility of particularized strategies of resistance to oppressive
conditions in law and the legal academy. Compare Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Self.
Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L REV. 1229 (1995), with Richard
Delgado, Coughlin's Complaint: How to Disparage Outsider Writing, One Year Later, 82 VA. L REV.
95 (1996), and Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Telling a Black Legal Story: Privilege, Authenticity,
"Blunders, " and Transformation in Outsider Narratives, 82 VA. L. REv. 69 (1996).
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Debates over the authenticity of racial voices, the typicality of racialized
stories, the significance of racial autobiographies, and the rise of racial
dogma reveal deep fissures in the epistemological underpinnings of
academic and practice communities.
At bottom, the conflicts within CRT and the attacks upon it emanate
from CRT's own growing antipathy toward the traditional civil rights
discourse that animates liberal race reform. To Critical Race theorists,
liberal faith in a court-driven, technocratic eradication of racial bias is
misplaced.3 Faith in the rationality of progressive law reform, they ar-
gue, rests on principles of neutrality, objectivity, and value-free reason-
ing. Obtaining a set of nonideological, regulative principles, however,
requires a depoliticization of the legal process. Depoliticization, in turn,
compels the separation of law and politics. When pushed outside the
domain of liberal theory, CLS teaches, the conceptual separation of law
and politics collapses in the raw, delegitimating competition for state
power.3 4 Because of this material inseparability, the depoliticization of
law and the liberal state fails. In this way, the CRT politics of race repre-
sents a complex variant of the CLS politics of law: power-driven, in-
strumental, and value-laden.
Critical Race theorists deny the possibility of a consensus-based,
formalist, non-instrumental legal process.35 They instead link the notion
of an apolitical juridical process to a naturalistic or a necessitarian vision
of white racial dominance. 6 The neutral treatment of racial power hier-
archies as normal or necessary, they explain, legitimates racialized forms
of speech and inequality, thwarting legal strategies of constitutional
32. The controversy over racial fundamentalism presently exploding in Asian-American legal
scholarship echoes the earlier "authenticity" debate embroiling CRT advocates and Randall
Kennedy. As before, the debate centers on the meaning of racial experience and the search for a
fair representation of that experience. Discerning an emerging exclusionary tendency in CRT
scholarship, Jim Chen decries the issuance of academic decrees of racial purity. In perhaps the most
acute exchange, Chen and others trade unbridled charges of political extremism and backlash.
Compare Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IOwA L REV. 145, 149 (1994), with Robert S. Chang, Toward an
Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81
CALIF. L REV. 1241 (1993). See generally Colloquy, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the
Politics of Backlash, 81 IowA L REV. 1467 (1996).
33. See, e.g., Davison M. Douglas, The Limits of Law in Accomplishing Racial Change: School
Segregation in the Pre-Brown North, 44 UCLA L. REV. 677 (1997).
34. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 247-49 (1997) (discussing liberal
and radical practices of delegitimation).
35. See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Anti-discrimination Law, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 103, 112-19.
36. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 276, 277-
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remediation. 7 But contesting the logic of such hierarchies, they com-
plain, attracts liberal disdain expressed in charges of anti-Enlightenment
vulgarity." This conflict can be seen most vividly in the controversy
over the liberal canon of color-blind equality. Dedicated to a vision of
formal equality, the liberal canon elevates opportunity over outcome.
To ensure equal opportunity, the canon emphasizes the value of process
and procedural fairness. Fidelity to process requires the removal of bias
and prejudice from legal rules, institutions, and systems. The notion of a
color-blind process implies that removal in favor of a race-neutral,
merit-based perspective. Controversy regularly erupts over the actual
extent of that removal and the genuine neutrality of any alternative
posture on race in law and in the assessment of legal merit. The next
section presents the CRT critique of color-blind equality.
1I
CRITIQUE
The CRT critique of color-blind equality combines an analysis of
race, power, and the rule of law. The predicate step of that analysis links
racial consciousness and power. The second step ties racial identity to
policies and practices of exclusion. The third step strips away the racial
form and substance of legal doctrine to reveal both a bias toward and an
ambiguity of color. Honing in on that ambiguity, the last step of the
analysis opens up race and racial identity to a broader, multifaceted in-
vestigation integrating gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation.
A. Color-Blind Equality
Liberal theorists rely on the axiom of color-blindness to deduce
the principles of formal equality, opportunity, and merit. The constitu-
tional ideal of color-blindness fashions the categories of equal oppor-
tunity and merit as neutral and impersonal, located at a distance from
the reach of power.39 Relying on opportunity and merit, of course, en-
tails the public and private importation of standards. Ministered by
largely white-dominated institutions, merit standards operate in a man-
ner apparently free of privilege, yet inimical to the experience and
37. See Kendall Thomas, Rouge et Noir Reread: A Popular Constitutional History of the Angelo
Herndon Case, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 465,476-81,484-90.
38. For a broad accounting of these charges, see Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Legal
Storytelling and Constitutional Law: The Medium and the Message, in LAW'S STORIES 37, 46-53
(Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
39. See Introduction to KEY WRITINGS, supra note 22, at xv (discussing affirmative action).
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identity of people of color." Under the regime of liberal legalism, attri-
butions of individual racial animus4 or institutional enmity" go uncon-
templated, absent probable evidence of invidious discrimination.
Critical Race theorists challenge the race-neutral ideal of color-
blindness and the corollary principles of formal equality, opportunity,
and merit. To test the thesis of color-blind constitutionalism, Derrick
Bell 3 revisits Herbert Wechsler's attempted postulation of neutral prin-
ciples in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education." Wechsler
opines that constitutional legitimacy requires a formal, value-free pro-
cess of adjudication based on the neutral application of forward-
looking, generalizable principles.45 He insists that constitutional legiti-
macy by design withstands the harsh consequences of social inequality.
The constitutional principle of freedom of association illustrates this
insulated notion of legitimacy.46 Despite evidence that the doctrine of
associational right has fostered racial inequality in private employment
and public education during the decades since the Brown decision,47
constitutional legitimacy lies undisturbed.
Rather than attack Wechsler's neutrality paradigm, Bell seeks to
satisfy its constitutional requisites. Accordingly, he asserts that Brown
clearly enunciates a guiding neutral principle, namely racial equality. 48
What Brown lacks, he observes, is the complementary convergence of
racial interest around matters of equitable relief and remedial imple-
mentation. 49 As a result, the post-Brown law reform campaign initially
40. Studies of law student recruitment and placement as well as law faculty hiring show deficits
in racial integration under traditional merit standards. See Lewis A. Komhauser & Richard L.
Revesz, Legal Education and Entry into the Legal Profession: The Role of Race, Gender, and
Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L REv. 829, 930-43 (1995); Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F.
Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97
COLUM. L REv. 199 (1997); Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An
Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission
Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1997).
41. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 46.
42. See Derrick Bell, The Civil Rights Chronicles: The Chronicle of the DeVine Gift, in
CuTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 390.
43. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence
Dilemma, in KEy WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 20.
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
45. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L REV.
1, 15-20 (1959).
46. See id. at 27-34.
47. See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 29.
48. See Bell, supra note 43, at 22.
49. See id.
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pursued remedies explicitly tailored to implement the mandate of de-
segregation. When white community defiance frustrated this remedial
strategy, the campaign refashioned the anti-segregation mandate to
command a discrimination-free environment." This shift generated
further acts of evasion in white communities as well as an increasing
sense of isolation in black communities.5' Lamenting this outcome and
the uncertain educational benefits extracted from desegregation reme-
dies, Bell urges reconsideration of model black schools, "where black
children, parents, and teachers can utilize the real cultural strengths of
the black community to overcome the many barriers to educational
achievement."' 2
Symbolic of the departure from the liberal integrationist model,
Bell's endorsement of model black schools highlights the fact that ef-
fective education and racial interest conformity hold central to the ful-
fillment of the promise of Brown. No doubt effective graduate
education in law demands the integration of scholars of color into the
legal academy. The racial integration of the legal academy is necessary
to satisfy the racial balance requirements of anti-segregation edicts and
integrationist sympathies. More importantly, it promises to enrich insti-
tutions with the cultural strengths of communities of color 3 and to em-
power students of color to overcome racial and socio-economic barriers
surrounding educational achievement.' The twin goals of enrichment
and empowerment provide the ground for racial interest conformity
between white and black academics.
Searching for common ground in the legal academy, Jerome
McCristal Culp finds traditional legal discourse and scholarship unre-
ceptive to the inclusion of race or racial autobiography. 5 Culp's find-
ings are unsurprising given that legal discourse prefers formalist,
impartial rhetorical structures, and legal scholarship favors detached,
impersonal rhetoric. Race, however, eludes formalist structures and in-
duces partisanship. Moreover, it embroils the emotions in personal and
passionate declamations.
50. See id. at 26.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. See K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS 118-38 (1996); Paul
Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REv. 855, 862-65 (1995).
54. See Judith D. Fischer, Portia Unbound: The Effects of a Supportive Law School Environment
on Women and Minority Students, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1996).
55. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching:
Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, in CuTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 409,411-12,415-16.
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Like Culp, Deborah Post judges the professional norms, values, and
aesthetics of legal education to be hostile to the politics of racial diver-
sity and identity. 6 Post warns that depriving the academy or the profes-
sion of the ideals of diversity strips each institution of the ability to
recognize and to accommodate difference. 7 Amplifying his prior, more
thoroughgoing critique of the diversity practices of the legal academy, 8
Richard Delgado asserts that academic "imperialists" employ several
mechanisms, including stereotyping, assimilation, and co-optation, to
devalue and blunt Critical Race scholarship. 9 The multifaceted process
of institutional marginalization results in the failure of ensconced aca-
demics to appreciate "race-ed" stories.
The CRT attack on the precepts of color-blind equality, oppor-
tunity, and merit indicates a rejection of the overarching,
Enlightenment-based rationality of the liberal tradition.' Yet, dispensing
with the color-blind trope of race-neutrality entirely" risks unleashing
narratives expressly concentrated in racial, indeed sometimes racist, ide-
ology. Calls for racialized jury nullification62 encounter this risk in
evoking race-based juror empathy. 3 Whether racial empathy increases
juridical sensitivity to the rule of law or the moral value of others re-
mains unsettled.' Because the presence of race is inescapable, the an-
swer must rely on the principles of race consciousness to overturn past
race-neutral regimes.
B. Racial Consciousness and Power
The liberal canon of formal equality produces a civil rights rhetoric
of good faith and universal reason that appears race-neutral, apolitical,
and integrationist. Bowing to the imperatives of legal formalism, the
rhetoric strives to maintain a veneer of value-free, nonpartisan
56. See Deborah Waire Post, Reflections on Identity, Diversity, and Morality, in CuTFING
EDGE, supra note 3, at 419,421.
57. See id. at 425.
58. See Delgado, supra note 41.
59. See Richard Delgado, "The Imperial Scholar" Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider
Writing, Ten Years Later, in CUTrING EDGE, supra note 3, at 401,403-06.
60. For a discussion on the rationality of the liberal tradition, see Gary Gerstle, The Protean
Character of American Liberalism, 99 AM. HST. REv. 1043 (1994).
61. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity, and the
California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135, 1137-41 (1996).
62. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 YALE LJ. 677 (1995).
63. See generally Douglas 0. Linder, Juror Empathy and Race, 63 TENN. L. REV. 887 (1996).
64. See id. at 912. See generally Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81
MINN. L. REv. 1149 (1997).
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consensus. Implicit in its language is a distrust of race consciousness
and racial power.
Critical Race theorists view race as a socially significant category of
perception and representation. Acknowledging the cognitive, linguistic,
and symbolic import of race and racial difference, they contend, en-
courages a commitment to political and cultural pluralism. In contrast to
the color-blind ideology of integrationism, the concept of multicultural
pluralism supports the race-conscious development of norms and dis-
courses of group or community justice. That development admits to a
tension between integrationist and black nationalist interpretations of
racial domination.
Gary Peller explores integrationist and black nationalist images of
racial injustice in communities undergoing public school integration."
His exploration reveals how the dynamics of power, subordination, and
legitimacy diminish the meaning of black nationalism in civil rights dis-
course. Duncan Kennedy connects the resulting integrationist ideal to a
systemic claim of white entitlement defined by color-blind meritocratic
fundamentalism.' Posing an alternative theory of cultural subordination
in defense of affirmative action, Kennedy sets forth the notion of cul-
tural pluralism to challenge the race-based, ideological content of aca-
demic standards.67 The reigning culture and ideology of race infect
scholarly judgment, he insists, and defeat the claim of rational mer-
itocratic judgment."
The corruption of meritocratic judgment subverts integrationist
norms applicable to people of color whether defined as individuals69 or
as groups. 7 These norms are not without costs. Alex Johnson, for in-
stance, points to the hidden cultural costs of integration. 7' The costs ac-
crue to individuals in-hostile environments and to communities in the
loss of identifying norms. 72 A different mix of costs, Kevin Brown adds,
65. See Gary Peller, Race-Consciousness, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 127.
66. See Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, in
KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 159.
67. See id. at 164.
68. See id. at 172.
69. See generally Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You
Really Want to Be a Role Model?, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 355.
70. See generally Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular
Times, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 191.
71. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism
Fails African-Americans Again, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 362, 363-65.
72. Id. at 368-69.
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may arise in the context of alternative immersion schools,73 even when
dedicated to an Afro-centric curriculum. 74 Here, the costs amass in es-
tablishing an empowering educational culture, rather than in mitigating
institutional antagonism.75
Both white and black communities suffer the costs of commitment
to a race-conscious perspective in the form of perceived racial injustice
and exclusion. But the repudiation of race consciousness carries certain
costs as well. Peller, for example, mentions the costs of tolerating preju-
dice and discrimination under the ideology of integrationism. 76 Toler-
ance of this kind, he explains, stems from the integrationist norms of
neutrality and equal treatment. 77 The norms suggest, wrongly, that the
march of liberal progress toward universal reason, individual freedom,
and collective value-consensus ultimately transcends racial bias.
The integrationist logic of racial transcendence treats surviving dis-
criminatory practices either as accidental distortions in social life un-
controlled by post-segregation remedial decrees or as actually unbiased
incidents permissible under prevailing civil rights standards. This logic
implies that discriminatory practices spring from acts of ignorance and
inadvertence largely curable through rehabilitative education. For ra-
tional, fair-minded individuals, the logic goes, such practices seem de-
plorable or farfetched.
Thus perceived, racial bias dissolves into a cognitive defect or a
counterfactual instinct. To the extent that the notion of race and the ex-
perience of racial bias forge the "social bonds of identity, recognition,
and solidarity, '8 the integrationist obliteration of bias, feigned or not,
hinders the formation of racial community. In this way, liberal integra-
tionist ideology suppresses the emergence of communities of color. The
ultimate cost of integrationism, therefore, is the loss of race-conscious
community. This result is neither inevitable nor desirable. The optimal
result permits integration but preserves racial identity. Conserving iden-
tity requires community.
Critical Race theorists relate integrationist ideology to racial power.
They find power embedded in color. Unsurprisingly, white is the color
73. See Kevin Brown, African-American Immersion Schools: Paradoxes of Race and Public
Education, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 373, 383.
74. See Sharon Keller, Something to Lose: The Black Community's Hard Choices about
Educational Choice, 24 NOTRE DAME J. LEGIS. (forthcoming 1997).
75. See Brown, supra note 73, at 380-82.
76. See Peller, supra note 65, at 150.
77. See id. at 129.
78. Id. at 138.
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of power-exerted privilege. In this sense, the equation of whiteness to
cultural and socioeconomic superiority is simply a function of power.
Framed by CRT, whiteness-both as artifact and as metaphor-
constitutes a social organizing principle. Ian Haney L6pez examines the
doctrinal construction of whiteness and the valuation of white identity.79
Exploding the notion of racial superiority, he calls for a self-
deconstructive white race-consciousness. 0 This injunction commands
more than deliberation or reflection in advocacy and adjudication.
Plainly, Haney L6pez is after something greater here. In effect, he seeks
a sort of categorical redefinition in the customary methods of social
construction that requires a sense of cognitive vigilance, what I call else-
where "self-paternalism."'
Thomas Ross pursues a similar analysis, probing the doctrinal
rhetoric of affirmative action for the images of white innocence and
racism. 2 To Ross, the rhetoric of innocence, often heard through allu-
sions to the "innocent white victim," reveals a powerful and dangerous
ideology of unconscious racism.83 Equating racism with white suprem-
acy, Trina Grillo and Stephanie Wildman explore the false appropriation
and mistaken inference of essentialist racial identity. Wildman and
Adrienne Davis note that acts of identity appropriation occur under the
cloak of linguistic neutrality and cultural hierarchy.85 They maintain
that a categorical pre-understanding of race, gender, and sexual orienta-
tion is basic to social and cultural hierarchy. 6 Derived originally from
the work of Paul Ricoeur, the notion of pre-understanding adverts to the
ontological structure that mediates interpretive knowledge and method.87
79. See Ian F. Haney Lpez, White by Law, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 542; see also
IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW (1996).
80. See Haney L6pez, White by Law, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 548.
81. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95
MICH. L. REV. 1063, 1103 (1997).
82. See Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at
551.
83. See id. at 557.
84. See Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The
Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other-isms), in CUTTING EDGE,
supra note 3, at 564.
85. See Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making Systems
of Privilege Visible, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 573.
86. See id. at 574.
87. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107,2123 n.57 (1991).
[Vol. 10:561
BLACK AND WHITE
1997] BLACK AND WHITE 1665
Allied with social construction, pre-understanding operates by applying
a standard narrative reading to story.8
A distorted pre-understanding of racial identity, Haney L6pez
points out, signifies a categorical practice grounded not in scientific evi-
dence, but upon common knowledge. 9 For Haney L6pez, the appeal to
common knowledge and its installation as a racial test in the statutory
jurisprudence of citizenship "shows that race is something that must be
measured in terms of what people believe, that it is a socially mediated
idea."9 Ideological measurement must also take account of the impact
of scientific racism on popular belief.'
Racial pre-understanding assigns a socially constructed category to
identify individuals and to invest power in their status and relationships.
Molded as a legal artifact, the category is mutable, expanding and con-
tracting to accommodate prejudice.92 Race, according to Haney L6pez,
thus degenerates into an unstable trope used to shield unequal distribu-
tions of power. Distributive patterns hinge on the relational construction
of race in terms of superior and inferior attributes. Haney L6pez con-
tends that the "hierarchical fantasy" of white identity "perpetuates and
necessitates patterns of superiority and inferiority" in society. 3 Those
patterns allocate racial power.
Critical Race theorists strive to dislodge the elements of race and
racial power entrenched in doctrinal categories. Their endeavors acquire
special importance in the fields of employment discrimination and vot-
ing rights, where redress hangs on the disclosure of political and socio-
economic inequality and on the demonstration of intentional acts of
power-associated discriminatory conduct. Lacking such evidence, the
enhancement of minority political power and the enlargement of mi-
nority representation in economic decision-making structures slows due
to, in part, greater reliance on traditional political and market forces.
Lani Guinier evaluates the possibilities of expanding group repre-
sentation in voting rights jurisprudence, despite the individualistic
88. See id. at 2123-24.
89. See Haney L6pez, supra note 79, at 544-45.
90. Id. at 546.
91. See generally MAROUF ARIF HASIAN, JR., THE RHETORIC OF EUGENICS IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN THOUGHT 51-71 (1996) (discussing popular eugenic beliefs in race-based biological
necessity and African-American strategies of accommodation and opposition); EDWARD J. LARSON,
Sax, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH 165-69 (1995) (documenting popular
development of eugenics doctrines and movements in the law and society of the Deep South).
92. See Haney L6pez, supra note 79, at 547.
93. Id. at 548.
1998]
LA RAZ4 LAW JOURNAL
1666 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1647
constraints of liberal legalism.94 Borrowing from Freudian and cognitive
psychology, Charles Lawrence posits unconscious racism as an added,
though frequently overlooked, constraint of the liberal legacy.9" En-
trenched under the regime of color-blind constitutionalism, unconscious
racism influences a variety of substantive law areas, such as the constitu-
tional doctrine of equal protection. Neil Gotanda regards the metaphor
of color-blind constitutionalism as a means of disguising and legitimat-
ing otherwise mutable categories 96 of subordination across race and eth-
nicity.97 While conceding that the color-blind trope intimates tolerance
and diversity, Gotanda derides this implied model of constitutionalism
for fostering cultural genocide. 98
Cheryl Harris reveals evidence of a different sort of genocide in
property doctrines.9 For Harris, property provides space for the conver-
gence of racial and legal status (e.g., slavery). Out of that joinder, white-
ness and property take on the functions of identity-based exclusion.1°°
Such forms of racialized privilege persist, Linda Greene comments, 0'
because of the liberal fusion of formalism and equality in contemporary
civil rights discourse."e Deducing jurisprudential lines of criticism from
Legal Realism, Derrick Bell assails the growing formalism insulating
civil rights law.'013
Critical Race Theory's support of race-conscious, instrumental
rules of adjudication implies the rationality of an alternative normative
theory of racial justice. Its own critique of normativity, however,
94. See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the
Emperor's Clothes, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 205.
95. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 235.
96. Gotanda enumerates several categories of race, including "status-race," exemplified by
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); "formal-race," exemplified by Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1895); and "historical-race," exemplified by Bakke v. Regents of University of California,
438 U.S. 265 (1978). See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," in KEY
WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 257, 262-63.
97. See Gotanda, supra note 96, at 257.
98. See id. at 270.
99. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 276.
100. See id. at 287.
101. See Linda Greene, Race in the Twenty-First Century: Equality Through Law?, in KEY
WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 292.
102. To demonstrate this fusion, Greene cites a recent cluster of formalist Supreme Court
opinions in the field of civil rights. See id. at 292-99 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.
642 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); and City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).
103. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Realism, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 302.
[Vol. 10:561
BLACK AND WHITE
1997] BLACK AND WHITE 1667
cogently demonstrates the shortcomings of normative theory-
building.' °4 Given this showing, together with the inherent inconstancy
of identity positions, the prospects for an intelligible race-conscious
method of adjudication seem dim. 05
C. Racial Identity and Exclusion
The liberal canon stands skeptical of racial identity. Skepticism
arises from the juridical demands of evidentiary proof in case-by-case
adjudication. The "conventional analytic methods" of proof are
integral to liberal legalism."° Significantly, the unstable, contextual dy-
namic of identity resists such demands. When mixed with the compo-
nents of race, gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, that resistance
stiffens, leading to misinterpretation and exclusion.'
°7
Critical Race theorists seek out racial identity and the socially con-
structed meaning of race in empirical and anecdotal evidence of exclu-
sion. They discern the imagery and language of exclusion throughout
law, culture, and society. Robert Chang, for example, describes the vio-
lence against Asian Americans as a manifestation of the nativistic strand
of white supremacy,0 8 evinced in immigration and naturalization re-
strictions, disfranchisement, and Japanese-American internment."°
Chang traces this legacy of discrimination to American immigration and
naturalization practices. Indeed, he finds the roots of Asian-American
cultural alienation and political powerlessness in long accumulated
practices of alien exclusion and denigration."' Coupled with evidence of
"systemic disfranchisement,""' this dual sense of alienation and pow-
erlessness inhibits the voice of Asian-American resistance.
104. See Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in
Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L REv. 933, 936 (1991).
105. Cf. Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE LJ. 253, 281 (1996)
(reviewing arguments by Heidegger that "suggest that the prospects for a fruitful normative theory of
adjudication may be dim").
106. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives, in CUTrING EDGE, supra note 3, at 283, 283.
107. For a discussion of interpretive contests over identity-based discrimination, see Christopher
A. Ford, Challenges and Dilemmas of Racial and Ethnic Identity in American and Post-Apartheid
South African Affirmative Action, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1953, 2005-08 (1996).
108. Cf. Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, in CUTTING EmE, supra
note 3, at 110-21 (illuminating the impact of both reformist and regnant legal developments on
American foreign policy by relocating historical displays of American racism to an international
setting).
109. See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory,
Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 322.
110. See id. at 329-31.
111. Id.at331.
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Others conduct similar investigations. Richard Delgado, for in-
stance, considers the psychological and sociological harm of racial ex-
clusion and insult."' Peggy Davis reconfigures that harm as a form of
cognitive microaggression."I Descriptively, microaggression captures
the deep-seated pain of racial animus experienced at the level of human
psychology."4 Sheri Lynn Johnson links cognition to race, attractive-
ness, and attributions of guilt and blameworthiness."' Haney L6pez
presses further, binding racial illusion to the biology of race and, hence,
discovering essentialist distortions in the conceptions of racial commu-
nity and interracial group conflict."6 Robin Barnes cites the same dis-
tortions in the biology of skin color."7
For Regina Austin, disclosing and combating the deformities of
racial character commands a politics of identification, especially in re-
building communities of color."' Lisa Ikemoto highlights the need for a
politics of racial identification by explicating the white supremacist de-
ployment of racial distancing stories and disorder symbols to strengthen
racialized claims of entitlement." 9 Robert Williams unravels strands of
nativistic violence in the denigration of the Cherokees' discourse of
tribal sovereignty and the white narrative pronouncement of tribalism's
inferior land rights.2 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic collect these
disparate, historical strands of white supremacy to assemble narrative
112. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 159.
113. See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 169.
114. Cognitive limitations of this sort extend to legal agents and decision-makers as well. See
generally Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the
Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L REV. 733 (1995); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and
the Cognitive Stakesfor Law, 137 U. PA. L REv. 1105 (1989).
115. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, in CUTTING EDGE, supra
note 3, at 180.
116. See Ian F. Haney Idpez, The Social Construction of Race, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3,
at 191.
117. See Robin D. Barnes, Politics and Passion: Theoretically a Dangerous Liaison, in CUTTING
EDGE, supra note 3, at 337.
118. See Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 293.
119. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African
American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles", in CUTTING EDGE, supra
note 3, at 305, 311-13.
120. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of
European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, in CUTTING
EDGE, supra note 3, at 98.
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images of the racial outsider.' The dominant systems of legal classifi-
cation, Delgado and Stefancic contend, such as Library of Congress
subject headings, legal periodical indexes, and the West Digest System,
exclude and obscure innovations in civil rights discourse by retaining a
traditional, white-centered approach to legal categorization."
This historical treatment silences people of color, especially in the
political arena. Levied by racially motivated violence, the silence
permits nativist myths to flourish. Chang points to these myths in
the guise of the "foreign" menace and the "model minority. ' 3 Ac-
cording to Chang, the conjuring of these myths denies the continuing
discrimination suffered by Asian Americans and legitimizes the inferior
status of other communities of color and even the economic impover-
ishment of some white communities.' At the same time, Chang main-
tains, recounting the Asian-American experience of identity-based
exclusion and recovering the testimony of survivors gives rise to an in-
surgent voice of protest against essentialist, myth-making constructions
of the racial self and racial community.
Ironically, anti-essentialist protest rises along the periphery of CRT
itself. Leveled against the CRT movement as a whole, the protest com-
plains of racial essentialism in the construction of black identity and the
black community. Randall Kennedy articulates a version of this accusa-
tion when he challenges the claim that black culture and scholarship are
racially distinctive." Kennedy's rebuke, however, ignores the chief
normative issue raised by Critical Race theorists: the exclusion and ex-
ploitation of racial categories in legal storytelling.2
6
121. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social llls?, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 217.
122. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories? Law Reform,
Critical Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma, in CUTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 206, 208.
123. See Chang, supra note 109, at 325-29.
124. See id. at 327.
125. See Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note
3, at 432, 435-36. But see Leslie G. Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal
Academia, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 451 (challenging Kennedy's critique of CRT).
126. For helpful overviews of legal narrative and storytelling, see NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL
DISCOURSE (David Ray Papke ed., 1991); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L
REV. 971 (1991) (discussing feminist narratives); Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories,
42 DUKE L.J. 630 (1992) (exploring storytelling in wills); Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S.
CAL. L REV. 255 (1994) (defending legal storytelling); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for
Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989) (promoting the use of
stories in the struggle for racial justice).
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Crucial constituents of the law and literature movement tolerate this
exclusion. 27 Equally troubling, they fail to account for such exile. Cate-
gorical exclusions of this type generally issue from an unchallenged
instrumental logic that asserts the narrative credibility, and consequent
efficacy, of certain stock racialized stories supplied to audiences com-
posed of majority-race judges and juries.
Critical Race theorists cast suspicion on stock racialized stories.
They investigate not only the form and structure of legal argument, but
also the stakes of legal narration and the goals of legal storytelling. This
investigation uncovers the omission of pivotal interpretive categories
from the study of narrative, for example, gender, ethnicity, sexual ori-
entation, and race.
D. Legal Doctrine
The liberal canon severs legal doctrine from its racial and political
foundation. Thus severed, doctrine occupies a formalist position of
color-blind impartiality. From this culturally detached position, racial
hierarchies appear imperceptible and subordinate narratives unfold
naturally. Unlike liberal theorists, Critical Race theorists emphasize the
utility of naming racial privilege when dealing with legal doctrine. To
that end, they envisage narratives and stories as opportunities for
"naming one's own reality." ' Gerald Torres and Kathryn Milun, for
example, enumerate the ways of rendering narratives authoritative, ex-
planatory, and relevant. 29 Torres and Milun look to Mashpee Tribe v.
Town of Mashpee"3 ' to illustrate the cultural core of evidentiary rele-
vance and reasoning, thereby highlighting the representation, contesta-
tion, and inversion of stories in law and legal discourse.' Their main
focus is the complex process of channeling outsider claims into the
"formalized idiom of the language of the state-the idiom of legal dis-
course."'' Applied in the Native-American context, this focus high-
lights the legal translation and evidentiary coding of claims produced
by irreconcilable systems of cultural meaning. 33
127. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES (1989); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND
LITERATURE (1988); RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS (1992).
128. CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 37.
129. See Gerald Tones & Kathym Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence:
The Mashpee Indian Case, in CUrrING EDGE, supra note 3, at 48.
130. 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978), affd sub nom. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp.,
592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979). See generally JACK CAMPISI, THE MASHPEE INDIANS (1991).





1997] BLACK AND WHITE 1671
For Torres and Milun, the cultural irreconcilability of state and
tribal claims within the dominant juridical system of white racial mean-
ing suggests that certain stories may prove untranslatable.' These sub-
ordinate stories fit poorly within the cultural-legal categories of
mainstream discourse. As a result, the doctrinal knowledge of and the
adjudicated truth about subordinate cultures remain incomplete. This
insufficiency often renders cultural claims of entitlement illegitimate.
Courts' discursive ability to delegitimize the entitlement claims of sub-
ordinate cultural communities, Torres and Milun explain, signals the
power to privilege specific forms of legal narrative and evidentiary
proof.
Juridical privileging of narrative occurs in the very text of judicial
opinions. Alert to this inscription, Thomas Ross reads opinions as narra-
tive texts of racist ideology.'35 Citing the Supreme Court's decision in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,36 he weighs the compelling narra-
tive logic of abstract principle against the narrative richness of historical
description. 37 Logically deduced but decontextualized narratives,
Margaret Russell observes, take on an almost cinematic quality, pre-
senting racial stereotypes under the dominant gaze of American racial
hierarchy.'38 Behind the pretense of the American gaze,'39 Delgado
remarks, lurks a racialized event and a stock cultural story."4 Omitted
from the telling of that story, according to Bell, is an evaluation of the
costs and benefits of racial discrimination. 4' Likewise overlooked,
Patricia Williams adds, is a recognition of the multiple perspectives em-
bedded in a single story. 42
Both the law and literature movement and CRT imagine storytelling
to occupy a place in legal discourse. The more dominant liberal vision
informing the law and literature movement, however, carves a false
134. See id. at 48-49.
135. See Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, in CuTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 38.
136. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
137. See Ross, supra note 135, at 39-40.
138. See Margaret M. Russell, Race and the Dominant Gaze: Narratives of Law and Inequality in
Popular Film, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 56, 57.
139. See generally ERIC LOTT, LOVE AND THEFT: BLACKFACE MINSTRELSY AND THE
AMERICAN NVORKING CLASS (1995); DAVID M. LUBIN, PICTURING A NATION: ART AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1994).
140. See Richard Delgado, Legal Storytelling: Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea
for Narrative, in CUTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 64, 68.
141. See Derrick Bell, Property Rights in Whiteness-Their Legal Legacy, Their Economic Costs,
in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 75, 75.
142. See Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, in CUTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 84, 88.
1998]
LA RAZA LAW JOURNAL
1672 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1647
dichotomy in story that differentiates traditional/legal from opposition-
ist/nonlegal forms of discourse based on insider and outsider group
status. 43 That dichotomy arises from tensions interior to liberal theory
that render traditional narratives unstable and open to internal and ex-
ternal contest. Liberal conceptions of community and equality both suf-
fer from such tensions.' 44 Understanding how traditional legal discourse
overcomes its inherent instability to tell apparently uncontested stories
about race requires an analysis of the institutional, relational, and ideo-
logical sources of political power. 45 At bottom, power shapes the
standards used to evaluate and the techniques applied to translate stories
into legal rules governing the treatment of race in American law.'
E. Intersectionality
The liberal canon conceptualizes race as a category separate and
apart from gender, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation. This categori-
cal partitioning corresponds to broader patterns of exclusion affecting
marginalized groups under liberal regimes.' 47  Those patterns
compromise the liberal search for even a provisional, adjudicated truth
in law and legal reasoning, relegating candor to the contingencies of
narrative necessity.' 4 Those contingencies-law, institutional procedure,
and socio-legal relationship--dictate narratives of partial truth and
piecemeal candor. Reaching for an imperializing, moralistic mode of
historical narrative 49 to stabilize shifting identity categories discredits
the claims of liberal tolerance. 5'
143. See generally Robert A. Ferguson, Untold Stories in the Law, in LAw's STORIES, supra note
7, at 84 (discussing the integrity of storytelling and the repression of untold stories).
144. For a useful catalogue of tensions central to liberal conceptions of equality and community,
see Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1997), and Glen 0. Robinson,
Communities, 83 VA. L. REv. 269 (1997).
145. For a discussion on how legal discourse exerts authority and organizes social relationships,
see Reva B. Siegel, In the Eyes of the Law: Reflections on the Authority of Legal Discourse, in LAw's
STORIES, supra note 7, at 225.
146. See David N. Rosen, Rhetoric and Result in the Bobby Seale Trial, in LAW'S STORIES, supra
note 7, at 110.
147. See generally Schacter, supra note 10, at 719-23 (exploring the relationship between
identity categories and equality); Susan H. Williams, A Feminist Reassessment of Civil Society, 72
IND. LJ. 417, 420-26 (1997) (discussing alternative conceptions of civil society that disadvantage
women).
148. See generally Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in
a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39 (1994) (examining legal storytelling in light of the disorderly
nature of truth).
149. See Robin West, Constitutional Fictions and Meritocratic Success Stories, 53 WASH. & LEE
L REV. 995, 1007-10 (1996) (discussing the dangers of moralistic historical narrative).
150. See Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in LAW'S STORIES, supra note 7, at 24, 32-36.
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Critical Race theorists stress the intersectionality of social and cul-
tural categories in law as well as in legal reasoning. Their primary focus
centers on the nexus of race and gender, though the categories of eth-
nicity' and sexual orientation'52 increasingly merge into that analysis.
The intersection of these categories occurs in contexts where legal actors
carry complex representational burdens or inhabit multiple social posi-
tions. Black, drug-addicted welfare mothers offer a case in point: not
only do they bear the burdens of race, gender, and drug abuse, but they
also endure the dehumanization of punitive state welfare measures.
Adopting an anti-essentialist stance, Critical Race theorists increas-
ingly approach identity as the contested product of a socio-legal process
of stereotypical character attribution. The components of identity-race,
gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation-thus align in a manner that is
neither natural nor mutually exclusive. Instead, identity is constructed
out of racial and gendered stereotypes,'53 exemplified above in the case
of black womanhood.
Kimberl6 Crenshaw locates the structural intersectionality of race
and gender in dominant political conceptualizations of rape and
battering, detecting common elements of racial domination and gender
subordination in the black experience of domestic violence."t Crenshaw
conceives of a culture of opposition fueled by identity politics.'55 Con-
trary to liberal conceptions of social justice that override identity-based
categories of difference, Crenshaw clasps on to difference as a "source
of social empowerment and reconstruction."'56 Deploying difference to
empower people of color to reconstruct systems of domination and
violence, she notes, requires an awareness of the intersecting patterns of
151. See generally Symposium, LatCrit Theory, Latinas/os, and the Law, 85 CALIF. L REV. 1087
(1997), 10 LA RAZA LJ. 1 (1997); Symposium, Difference, Solidarity and Law: Building Latinalo
Communities Through LatCrit Theory, 19 UCLA CHICANO-LATINO L REV. (forthcoming 1998);
Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2
HARV. LATINO L REV. (forthcoming 1997); Symposium, Representing Latinalo Communities:
Critical Race Theory and Practice, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1996).
152. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and
Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263 (1995); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and
Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-
American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1995); Valdes, supra note 10.
153. See Margaret E. Montoya, Border/ed Identities: Narrative and the Social Construction of
Personal and Collective Identities, in CROSSING BOUNDARIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS
IN LAW AND SOCIETY RESEARCH (Austin Sarat et al., eds. forthcoming 1998) (discussing daughter's
experience of racialized self-estrangement).
154. See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 357, 358.
155. See id. at 357.
156. Id.
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experience and identity in society, especially for women of color com-
bating male violence.
To Crenshaw, the social world furnishes "multiple grounds of
identity.' 57 Interventions into that world to organize a culture of oppo-
sition must build on these disparate grounds. Crenshaw concedes that
organizing an oppositional culture entails dealing with issues of physical
vulnerability, economic subordination, and political conflict. Failure to
resolve these issues, she contends, produces isolation and disempower-
ment. Reconceiving difference in a guise receptive to multiple identities
and organizing around cohort identity groups to engage in politics en-
courages a culture of opposition and participation.
Dorothy Roberts also discusses race and gender in considering the
state's punitive response to drug-addicted black mothers during epi-
sodes of a spiraling crack epidemic. 58 Recalling the experience of slav-
ery, Roberts deplores the disproportionate impact of state action on
poor black women, citing high rates of punitive criminal prosecutions,
the involuntary removal of black children, and coercive sterilization. 9
To Roberts, state disciplinary measures devalue black motherhood and
perpetuate racial hierarchy through unconstitutional government intru-
sions upon individual and family privacy. 1' ° To fight these incursions,
she proposes the design of a new privacy jurisprudence protective of
those who are at once fallible and dependent on state largess.'6,
Regina Austin enlarges this proposal, conceiving of a full-blown
agenda for black feminist legal scholarship. 62 Sifting the elements of
Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club,63 a twin employment and pregnancy
discrimination case, Austin augments the Critical Race analysis of racial
hierarchy by shifting her focus away from state encroachment on the
rights of black women and toward state abandonment of the protection
of black women against discrimination. 1" Austin's study of Chambers
157. Id. at 358.
158. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, in KEY WRrrINGS, supra note 2, at 384, 386.
159. See id. at 388-92.
160. See id. at 389. Lisa lkemoto also explores the ideological celebration and devaluation of
motherhood. Charting the path of gender ideology during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, she uncovers long-standing state regulatory practices of intervention in the lives of
pregnant women. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the
Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of the
Law, in CuTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 478.
161. See Roberts, supra note 158, at 403-05.
162. See Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 426,427.
163. 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986), aff'd, 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987).
164. See Austin, supra note 162, at 429.
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illustrates the continuing oppression of black women in employment as
well as the diversity of black women's cultural practices in the areas of
the family and reproductive freedom.
While Richard Delgado makes reference to essentialist theorizing,
even among reform-minded oppositional groups,"' Angela Harris's
precise explanation of the interplay of race and essentialism in feminist
legal theory isolates the tendency to bracket race and to erase black
women from the landscape of gender domination.'66 Paulette Caldwell
overcomes this tendency in showing the "interlocking figurations" of
race and gender 67 that give shape to the employment discrimination
case of Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc.6 This complex configuration,
Caldwell notes, also gives rise to the experience of shame. 69
Caldwell's allusion to shame introduces the concept of spirit injury
experienced at the intersection of identity and racialized or sexualized
violence. Adrien Wing and Sylke Merch6n denote the violence of rape
as a spirit injury in Muslim culture.7 Rousing the American history of
slavery and miscegenation, Wing and Merchdn delineate the transna-
tional symptoms of rape injury in both physical and spiritual terms: de-
filement, silence, emasculation, trespass, and pollution.'7'
To be sure, the experience of humiliation conveyed by Jennifer
Russell's personal account of racial antagonism in the legal academy'72
constitutes a different order of harm than sexual violence. Nevertheless,
the intersectionality thesis demonstrates that the injury of humiliation
frequently accompanies racial and ethnic subordination, at times occur-
ring subsequent to assimilation. Margaret Montoya comments that law
erects linguistic barriers that effectively mask the pain of bias injuries,
thereby silencing outsider narratives of deprivation.7 7 To remedy such
deprivation, even when it afflicts alleged law breakers, Monica Evans
165. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma
of Social Reform, in CUrING EDGE, supra note 3, at 242,243.
166. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, in CUTrrING EDGE,
supra note 3, at 253, 255.
167. Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender,
in CUTTING EaE, supra note 3, at 267, 270.
168. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
169. See Caldwell, supra note 167, at 275.
170. See Adrien Katherine Wing & Sylke MerchAn, Rape, Ethnicity, and Culture: Spirit Injury
from Bosnia to Black America, in CUrrING EaE, supra note 3, at 516, 518.
171. See id. at 521-25.
172. See Jennifer M. Russell, On Being a Gorilla in Your Midst, or, The Life of One Blackwoman
in the Legal Academy, in CUrrING EDGE, supra note 3, at 498.
173. See Margaret E. Montoya, Mscaras, Trenzas, y Grefias: Un/masking the Self While
Un/braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 529, 538-39.
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recommends building a culture of opposition in communities of color
founded on the rhetoric of rights.74
The production and intersection of racialized stories inside and
outside the courtroom often enlists spurious claims of objectivity and
truth in defense of narrative exclusion. Both liberals 75 and Critical Race
theorists 76 tend to focus their analysis of categorical overlap in identity
constructions on trials and the narrative transactions at trials involving
lawyers and judges. This focus overlooks the importance of the pretrial
activity of law offices, street-level institutions, and clients to case con-
struction.17 7 Envisioning the socio-legal process of identity construction
as a narrative struggle in these broader terms requires a description of
how lawyers, clients, and other legal agents experience narrative compe-
tition over conflicting evidence and regulation under legal rules. This
view also prompts scrutiny of the interpretive methods used by lawyers
to present a client's story that intersects with wider social narratives. The
next section considers the resolution of the internal CRT conflict over
liberal and postmodern visions of racial equality and emancipation.
RECONCILIATIONS
The CRT struggle to reform liberal legalism rises from a long-
standing vision of racial equality and emancipation. The failure of inte-
gration, the persistence of inequality, and the continuing entailments of
bondage manifested in black poverty and punitive cycles of probation,
prison, and parole increasingly cloud that vision. The turn to postmod-
ernism in CRT indicates less an abandonment of liberal ideals than a
keen disillusionment about the likelihood of their fruition. In this way,
the turn seems partial and unresolved. For in the alternative rhetoric of
174. See Monica J. Evans, Stealing Away: Black Women, Outlaw Culture and the Rhetoric of
Rights, in CurrINo EDGE, supra note 3, at 502, 510-12.
175. See generally Robert Weisberg, Proclaiming Trials as Narratives: Premises and Pretenses,
in LAW'S STORIES, supra note 38, at 61 (discussing the role of narrative in law); see also Janet
Malcolm, The Side-Bar Conference, in LAW'S STORIEs, supra note 38, at 106 (assessing the impact of
narrative transactions between lawyers and judges on the result of a trial).
176. See, e.g., Kendall Thomas, Rouge et Noir Reread: A Popular Constitutional History of the
Angelo Herndon Case, in KEY WRITINGS supra note 2, at 465, 476-81, 484-90.
177. See generally Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text:
Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1310-28 (1992) (discussing
the pre-trial development of a criminal defense); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The
Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE LJ. 763 (1995) (exploring the importance of pleading
to the communication of the plaintiff's story); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing
Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994) (analyzing the role of the client's story
in the attorney's development of case theory).
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postmodernism, CRT mixes antithetical calls for coalition-building and
praxis. The battle to reconcile these competing rhetorics will shape the
future of CRT in the academy and in the courts.
A. Postmodernism
The liberal canon deems law and legal reasoning to be the ingredi-
ents of a carefully honed craft. The notion of craft connotes a stable
juridical universe in which norms are fixed and historical truth is realiz-
able, indeed where "what has been constructed is perceived to have
been properly construed."'78 The performative rhetoric of craft, both in
advocacy and in adjudication, interweaves force and persuasion with the
"ascription of trustworthiness."'79 Postmodernism, especially the iden-
tity-based' 0 and culturally contingent'8 ' version that Critical Race theo-
rists pull and recast from Continental materials,' exalts the play of
interpretive practices' put into the service of justice.8 4 Engrafting race
and postmodernism in the field of inequality reconfigures the topics of
historical truth' 5 and human value' 6 to accommodate contingency and
context. That reconfiguration revives practical commitments to provi-
sional truth claims and localized normative decision making carried out
in the face of tentative, and sometimes temporary, identity categories. 87
178. John Hollander, Legal Rhetoric, in LAW'S STORms, supra note 38, at 176, 183.
179. Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAw's STORIES, supra note 38,
at 187, 204.
180. See, e.g., Jody Armour, Just Deserts [sic]: Narrative, Perspective, Choice, and Blame, 57
U. Prrr. L. REV. 525 (1996); Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and
Black Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1990).
181. See, e.g., Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based upon the Toxicity of the
Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV. 731
(1996); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of
Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REv. 367 (1996).
182. See Douglas E. Litowitz, Some Critical Thoughts on Critical Race Theory, 72 NOTRE DAME
L REV. 503, 503 (1997).
183. See generally J.M. Balkin, A Night in the Topics: The Reason of Legal Rhetoric and the
Rhetoric of Legal Reason, in LAw's STORIES, supra note 38, at 211 (noting the practical, sociological,
and critical benefits of legal interpretation and rhetorical invention through topics); Barbara Stark,
The Practice of Law as Play, 30 GA. L. REV. 1005, 1018 (1996) (discussing legal storytelling as play).
184. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95 MicH. L REV. 166,
197-201 (1996).
185. See Tracy E. Higgins, "By Reason of Their Sex": Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and
Justice, 80 CORNELL L REV. 1536, 1585, 1587 (1995).
186. Postmodernists treat the topic of normative commitment and value as rhetorical gloss. See,
e.g., Schlag, Hiding the Ball, supra note 14, at 1715-16; Schlag, Values, supra note 16, at 220.
187. On the practice of identity politics, see Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself: Identity,
Politics, and Law, 75 OR. L REV. 647 (1996).
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Critical Race theorists, drawing on postmodernism, affirm the con-
tingent, indeterminate, and socially constructed nature of identity cate-
gories. Proclaiming legal identity unstable and contradictory, they
contend that there is no fixed meaning to "race" apart from social
context. But rather than abolish the idea of race or preserve traditional
ascriptions, they adopt a new paradigm of cultural pluralism recovered
from the "popular memory" of neglected histories of community
struggle against racial injustice.'88 This alternative vision of cultural plu-
ralism transforms the character of social space from an apolitical,
atomistic realm of isolated individuals to an insurgent, participatory
community of connected citizens.
Jayne Chong-Soon Lee advances this popular recovery by locating
the possibility of racial resistance in generalized legal contexts,'89 even in
the ghettoizing judicial constructions of race.19° Lee asserts that cultural
pluralism precludes conflation of the biological and the racial, and, thus,
the reinscription of racial stereotypes and subordination. For Lee, plu-
ralism hinges on the inclusion of racial experiences obtained by grant-
ing groups the power of racial self-definition and tolerating the multiple
definitions of race that may ensue. 19' Because this self-definitional al-
lowance invites turmoil, it warrants the incorporation of democratic
checking mechanisms to insure against community disintegration.
Acute circumstances of racial animus or group conflict may prove such
mechanisms inadequate to save a community from splintering.
The multiplicity of racial definition under a regime of cultural
pluralism, Richard Ford points out, bears on the construction of
racially identified political and social space." To Ford, the
creation and perpetuation of racially identified spaces, whether for
economic-structural or political reasons, holds serious implications for
racial harmony.1 93 Insofar as pluralism entails elements of community
self-definition under a legal conception of space--e.g., exclusionary
zoning-the distributive consequences of local racial politics are signifi-
cant.' 94 The segregation of political and social space that results from
188. See KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 440.
189. See Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Navigating the Topology of Race, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note
2, at 441.
190. See id. at 444-46.
191. See id. at 441.
192. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 449.
193. See id.
194. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 740-41 (1974) (stating that a court may not
treat local school district boundaries as "mere administrative convenience" in order to effect its view
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local racial politics directs traditional conceptions of autonomy and as-
sociation toward a legal practice of culturally plural political space
where the boundaries of race may be redrawn in terms beside desegre-
gation and integration.'95
The cultural realignment of desegregation and integration requires
an effective political language of racial resistance and struggle. That
language, Kendall Thomas reminds us,' 9 6 may be culled from the rheto-
ric of resistance found in the historical trials of contested political rights.
Thomas' account of the historic case of Herndon v. Lowry197 deciphers
the rhetoric of resistance located at the constitutional intersection of
race, culture, and politics. Undertaken to revise constitutional historiog-
raphy, his account presents a cultural history of Angelo Herndon's po-
litical struggle against the State of Georgia to win the right to
community organize. For Thomas, the key to the Herndon case is the
remembrance of resistance to race-inscribed political repression. The
key to resistance is coalition-building.
B. Coalition-Building
The liberal canon suggests that coalition-building unfolds naturally
out of the obligations and rituals of democratic citizenship. Under the
neo-republican vision of liberalism, civic obligations pertain to the
community ethos of collective deliberation and universal debate in de-
centralized public assemblies. Participatory rituals encircle church,
school, and local institutions of cooperative self-government. Fulfilling
the obligations of self-rule and civic virtue in small groups or associa-
tions coincides with a revival of neo-republican values developing adja-
cent to and sometimes in tandem with liberal frameworks of political
theory. 9 ' Heralded by liberal reformers, the neo-republican vision prof-
fers to cure the political disenfranchisement and underrepresentation of
people of color through cross-cultural coalition-building.
of a desirable racial balance among the schools of a metropolitan area); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (finding that residence in a school district that has "less
taxable wealth than other districts" does not trigger heightened scrutiny under the equal protection
clause).
195. See Ford, supra note 192, at 449.
196. See Thomas, supra note 176.
197. 301 U.S. 242 (1937); see also Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935); see generally
CHARLES H. MARTIN, THE ANGELO HERNDON CASE AND SOUTHERN JUSTICE (1976).
198. See generally Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1495 (1988)
(fashioning republicanism as a means to renovate political communities and to enhance political
freedom); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1537, 1541 (1988)
(articulating a theory of "liberal republicanism").
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Critical Race theorists approach reformist coalition-building with
apprehension. The stylistic allure of neo-republicanism devolves into a
distrust well-earned by practices of exclusion.' At the same time, the
bare admission of methodological commonalities with the CLS
movement leaves past quarrels unresolved.2" Further, charges of CLS-
instigated exclusion and exploitation remain unsettled. Even if media-
tion is available, reconciliation will never come about without correction
of the normative and pragmatic deficiencies of the CLS paradigm. The
reconstruction of liberalism depends on normative vision and pragmatic
advocacy, not merely deconstruction. Under liberal regimes, normative
vision must unite conceptions of individual entitlement and community
obligation. Pressing this unification in pragmatic advocacy dictates al-
ternative lawyering stratagems linked to community mobilization 0' and
ethical precepts based on broadly framed ideals of justice.02
The springboard for the normative rehabilitation of CLS is the dis-
course of civil rights. Kimberl6 Crenshaw contends that the indeter-
minacy and hegemonic function of civil rights discourse in no way pre-
vents self-conscious ideological and political struggle against racism, in
spite of the risk of legitimizing court-approved instances of bias and
inequality.0 3 Mari Matsuda offers the right of reparations in the context
of Japanese-American and Native-Hawaiian claims for redress as an ex-
ample of a critical, transformative discourse grounded in both liberal
legalism and historical oppression.' ° More broadly, Harlan Dalton ac-
centuates the importance of rights discourse to the development of
a positive, reconstructive program for race reform.0 5 Confirming
Dalton's pragmatic conception of rights, Anthony Cook adds that a
199. See Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE
LJ. 1609, 1610-13 (1988); Wendy Brown-Scott, The Communitarian State: Lawlessness or Law
Reform for African-Americans?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1211-15 (1994).
200. See Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What
Minorities Want? 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 301 (1987) (assailing LS from the perspective of
"minorities"); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical
Legal Theory for Peoples of Color, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 103 (1987) (questioning whether the
renunciation of "rights" discourse by CLS assists people of color in their legal struggles).
201. See GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIoUs LAWYERING (1992).
202. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
203. See Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 103.
204. See Mad Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, in KEY
WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 63.
205. See Harlan L. Dalton, The Clouded Prism: Minority Critique of the Critical Legal Studies
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reconstructive vision demands a theological center comprised of church
teachings.' °s Cook points to the historic role of the African-American
church in organizing and mobilizing community opposition to institu-
tional racism."1 Moreover, he lauds the critical theology of Martin
Luther King, Jr., as an important "potential source for alternative con-
ceptions of community.""0 8 To Cook, critical theology holds the poten-
tial for delegitimating authority and for mobilizing a cooperative,
participatory community ethos."°
Overcoming the justifiable skepticism of Critical Race theorists di-
rected toward republican-minded liberals and CLS activists in order to
induce their entry into coalition politics requires the suspension of racial
distrust. Scant evidence supports the impulse to set aside suspicion. For
people of color, neither empathy nor emotion affords consolation for
historical betrayal. The logic of coalition-building boils down to the
practical calculations of community organization and mobilization to
gain political power. The drive for power commands a problem-solving
orientation found in the evolving advocacy traditions of feminist,
210
political,2"' and sometimes affective,212 lawyering. Those traditions strive
to fuse the theory and practice of advocacy into a form of praxis.
206. See Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 85.
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. For a discussion of the National Council of Churches and its Commission on Religion and
Race in aiding theology-inspired community mobilization in Mississippi during the 1960s, see JAMES
F. FINDLAY, JR., CHURCH PEOPLE IN THE STRUGGLE (1993).
210. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ 39 (1985); Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to
Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations About Women, the Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4
DUKE J. GENDER L & POL'Y 119 (1997).
211. See, e.g., GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING (1992); Symposium, Political
Lawyering: Conversations on Progressive Social Change, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 285 (1996);
Symposium, Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L REV. 983 (1994).
212. See, e.g., Linda G. Mills, On the Other Side of Silence: Affective Lawyering for Intimate
Abuse, 81 CORNELL L REV. 1225 (1996). Linda Mills locates "affective lawyering" within the
American tradition of progressive advocacy, especially as expressed in the field of poverty law. See
id. at 1229 n.14. For Mills, affective lawyering "demands that lawyers understand their own political
and social transformation, not intellectually or ideologically, but rather, through their personal
experiences of strength and weakness, passion and melancholy, distance and deprivation in all facets
of their lives." Id. at 1228. In terms of methodology, it demands that advocates meet their
"emotionally frightened and politically disempowered" clients at an interpersonal level. Id.
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C. Praxis
The liberal canon divides theory and practice into rigid categories
of discrete analysis. This long-standing division stems from several
sources, including the disposition of academic theorists, the nature of
advocacy traditions, and the content of legal education, particularly the
curricular substance of clinical programs. Although the advent of a
theoretics-of-practice movement shows some headway in bridging the
theory/practice gap,213 both the CLS and CRT movements inhibit prog-
ress by replicating the theory/practice dichotomy."4 This joint tendency
casts doubt on the likelihood of achieving the fusion of theory and
practice in praxis.2"5 Yet, Critical Race theorists persevere, marshaling a
critique of liberalism embedded in theory and in pedagogy gleaned
from the diverse material and spiritual experiences of people of color.
Their collective voice challenges the widespread race-privileging recur-
rent in the structure of law and legal education and, hence, supplies an
alternative culture of resistance and a promise of political liberation.
Evaluating the promise of a CRT liberation politics, Derrick Bell
meditates on the associations of hope and despair for people of color.2 6
Girardeau Spann espouses the hope of a positive politics, notwithstand-
ing the frustrations of thwarted litigation and electoral majoritarian-
ism.2"7 Michael Olivas reiterates that hope, summoning suppressed
histories of racial and ethnic community struggle for inspiration.218
Although Bell ratifies community, he unsettles the unitary notion
of racial community. Charting the local history of civil rights litigation
in a battery of school desegregation cases, he unearths conflicts ignited
by the incommensurable remedial goals of lawyers, clients, and com-
munities.2 9 Efforts to reframe these and other goals or to recalibrate
213. See Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective on Critical
Legal Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992).
214. See generally John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewing
a Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair," 143 U. PA. L REV. 1233 (1995) (applying CRT to
progressive practice).
215. For proclamations of a Critical Race praxis, see Raneta Lawson, Critical Race Theory as
Praxis: A View From Outside the Outside, 38 How. L.J. 353 (1995); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race
Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV.
821 (1997).
216. See Derrick Bell, Racial Realism-After We're Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in
a Post-Racial Epoch, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 2, 2-3.
217. See Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 21, 28-29.
218. See Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather's Stories, and Immigration Law:
The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 9.
219. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 5.
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tactics, Richard Delgado acknowledges, are unlikely to provide full
relief . 0
For Alan Freeman, the entertainment of conventional relief merely
accepts the myths of liberal reform2 1 To escape these myths, Freeman
turns to pedagogy, assessing the potential for subversion under two
strategies. The first seeks to achieve remedial gains through the "self-
conscious manipulation of legal doctrine" without reinforcing juridical
legitimacy. m The second works to politicize legal doctrine in order " to
reveal contradictions and limits, promote public awareness, and even win
cases."'m By Freeman's own judgment, both strategies fail. The
alternative, he announces, is to confront the historical underpinnings of
legal doctrine and adjudication."
Historical confrontation presents issues of cultural authenticity.
Taunya Banks'"z endorsement of life stories as a pedagogical frame of
reference comports with the notion of cultural authenticity. For Charles
Lawrence, as well, affirming a pedagogy of subjectivity, story, and nar-
rative affords an authentic form of contextual learning rooted in social
and historical texts. 6 John Calmore's vision of oppositional cultural
practice is grounded in racial history. Only out of that history, Calmore
declares, can a culturally authentic liberating practice successfully
emerge. 7
Like Banks and Lawrence, Calmore's turn to an oppositional cul-
tural practice lays challenge to the universality of white experience as
the authoritative standard of conduct and judgment in law and legal
education.?8 That oppositional stance, however, is not ungrounded,
turning instead to cultural experience, class, and community. Those
220. See Richard Delgado, Beyond Criticism-Synthesis? Left-Right Parallels in Recent Writing
About Race, in CuTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 464,469.
221. See Alan D. Freeman, Derrick Bell-Race and Class: The Dilemma of Liberal Reform, in
CUTTING EDGE, supra note 3, at 458, 460.
222. Id. at 462.
223. Id.
224. See id. Freeman excuses his belated encounter with history by stating: "The task of
unmasking, of exposing presuppositions, of delegitimizing, is easier than that of offering a concrete
historical account to replace what is exposed as inadequate." Id.
225. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Two Life Stories: Reflections of One Black Woman Law
Professor, in KY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 329.
226. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as
Struggle, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 336.
227. See John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an
Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 315.
228. See id. at 318.
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context-setting factors ground the subjective orientation of people of
color directed toward racial reconstruction.
The reconfiguration of the CRT race-conscious vision of an oppo-
sitional cultural practice and pedagogy into a transformative strategy of
community-based legal and political advocacy falls on the resolution of
complicated, and often puzzling, issues of authenticity, difference, and
responsibility. No indicia exist to test the authenticity of client or com-
munity opposition to the material edifices of racist ideology. Further-
more, the notion of authenticity229 presents no clear-cut role for the
advocate and no strategy for dealing with difference either in legal
rights litigation or in political organizing. At a minimum, CRT urges the
race-conscious advocate to take responsibility for his acts of speech and
silence' 30 and to create and to abide by an ethic of narrative authorship
in matters of race. 3'
To be of use to clients and communities of color, the ethic of nar-
rative authorship must translate into a practice of advocacy. American
legal history proffers advocacy traditions for both privatep2 and pub-
lic 3 realms of lawyering. Evidently, Critical Race theorists find none of
these traditions persuasive, for they relegate lawyering to virtual silence.
The posture of silence sacrifices opportunities to integrate theory and
practice. Without integration, no legal-political praxis will take shape.
Consider briefly the numerous opportunities for inventing a Crit-
ical Race praxis currently available in American law and society. Look,
229. See generally Susan G. Kupfer, Authentic Legal Practices, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 33,
71-90 (1996).
230. See Wendy Brown, In the 'folds of our own discourse': The Pleasures and Freedoms of
Silence, 3 ROUNDTABLE 185, 197 (1996). Wendy Brown points to silence as "a mode of resistance to
power." Id. To Brown, "refusing to speak is a method of refusing colonization, refusing complicity in
injurious interpellations or subjection through regulation." Id. She cautions, however, that the practice
of "refusing to speak" in the context of domination, whether asserted as a defense or a strategy for
negotiation, fails to offer freedom. See id. Silence, in this sense, signifies resistance rather than
emancipation. See id.
231. Cf ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975). Robert Cover's study of the dilemma of
the antislavery judge in confronting "the choice between the demands of role and the voice of
conscience" evokes the notion of an ethic of narrative authorship. Id. at 6. The extension of Cover's
analysis of judicial moral-formal performance to the field of race-conscious advocacy illuminates the
continuing hard choices at stake and the inevitable dissonance accompanying those choices.
232. See, e.g., MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS (1991)
(documenting the transformation of large-firm law practice); MICHAEL J. KELLY, LIVES OF
LAWYERS (1994) (studying solo and small-firm law practice); CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF
PRACTICING LAW (1996) (describing law practices in large- and small-finn, corporate, and
government settings).
233. See, e.g., MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED (1993) (chronicling the litigation history of the
welfare rights movement); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (1994) (tracing the
course of civil rights litigation through the work of Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP).
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for instance, to the intersections of race, crime, and the criminal justice
system shown in high-profile and low-order trials.,, Witness the rela-
tionship between race and the environment in locating polluting facili-
ties." Further, note the impact of race on jury selection 6  and
deliberation Z7 demonstrated through the use of peremptory chal-
lenges"s and nullification. z9 Additionally, observe the unfolding
controversy over the ethical regulation of race in federal and state court-
rooms and bar associations.2 ° Race infects each of these contexts,
generating ample opportunities for theoretical and practical experi-
mentation in law and lawyering.
234. See generally JUSTICE WITH PREJUDICE (Michael J. Lynch & E. Britt Patterson eds., 1996);
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-
RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995); Symposium, Criminal Law, Criminal Justice,
and Race, 67 TUL. L REV. 1725 (1993); Symposium, Justice and the Criminal Justice System, 20
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 323 (1997); Symposium, O.J. Simpson and the Criminal Justice System on
Trial, 67 U. COLO. L REV. 727 (1996); Symposium, People v. Simpson: Perspectives on the
Implications for the Criminal Justice System, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1233 (1996).
235. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE 153-239 (Kenneth A. Manaster ed.,
1995); see generally Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REV. 75, 120-27
(1996); Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The Quest for Environmental Justice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721,
731-38 (1993); Carolyn M. Mitchell, Note, Environmental Racism: Race as a Primary Factor in the
Selection of Hazardous Waste Sites, 12 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 176 (1993).
236. See generally Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary
Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 711-19 (1993); Donna J.
Meyer, Note, A New Peremptory Inclusion to Increase Representativeness and Impartiality in Jury
Selection, 45 CASE W. RES. L REV. 251, 266-72 (1994).
237. See generally Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the
Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 75-100 (1993).
238. See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of
Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L REV. 21 (1993); Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held
Hostage: Race, Ideology and the Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 63 (1993);
Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of
Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099 (1994).
239. Compare Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification: A Response to
Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L. REV. 109, 111 (1996) (characterizing the endorsement of race-based
jury nullification as "foolish and dangerous"), with Paul Butler, The Evil of American Criminal
Justice: A Reply, 44 UCLA L. REV. 143 (1996) (arguing that race-based jury nullification serves to
combat racism in the American criminal justice system).
240. Discord over the regulation of race through ethical codes resists neat division into opposing
race-conscious and race-neutral positions. Paradoxically, proponents and opponents of ethical
regulation concede the importance of race-conscious advocacy. Proponents, however, judge race-
conscious forms of advocacy to be injurious to lawyers, clients, courts, and the law itself. Opponents
consider the same forms of advocacy to be obligatory expressions of the adversarial system, injurious
or not. Compare Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L REV. 1301 (1995),
aid Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the Court: Why the First
Amendment Is No Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism, and Ethnic Bias in the Legal Profession, 9 GEo.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 781 (1996), with Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives:
Discovering the Road Less Traveled, 96 COLUM. L REV. 788 (1996), and Eva S. Nilson, The Criminal
Defense Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1994).





The writings of CRT build on earlier theoretical and practical
struggles to open up alternatives to the paradigm of liberal legalism and
its canon of color-blind adjudication. Although those alternative models
are not yet fully formed, their outlines may be traced through the on-
going scholarly efforts to recast the meaning of race consciousness and
power, racial identity and exclusion, and racialized voice and narra-
tive. The recasting of difference and diversity into a pluralist, mul-
ticultural vision invites the friends of CRT to move beyond mere
sentiment and altruism toward collaborative experience and commit-
ment. Perhaps then we can dream beyond the colors of black and white.
241. Both of the instant CRT collections reflect transformative scholarly efforts. Equally
deserving of praise, the two collections nevertheless differ in their structure and purpose.
Structurally, The Cutting Edge anthology offers section-by-section summary overviews, issue-
oriented commentary, and bibliographies. The sections comprise bundles of closely edited articles. In
this way, The Cutting Edge makes an ideal text for an introductory jurisprudence course. It also
provides a valuable supplement to a course in a wide variety of substantive and clinical fields.
In the same way, The Key Writings anthology furnishes section-by-section summary treatments
and well-integrated clusters of articles. Unlike its allied anthology, however, The Key Writings
forgoes substantial editing, allowing for greater elaboration and stylistic distinction. The resulting
density makes The Key Writings perhaps more appropriate for an advanced course either in
jurisprudence or elsewhere. Unfortunately, limiting the text to this curricular segment narrows the
breadth of appreciation for the stunning introductory essay that begins The Key Writings, an essay that
stands out even among the many compelling works of the CRT literature.
